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The Marine Corps’ recent reemphasis on amphibious operations has 
identified a potential operational reach gap in the sustainment window of the 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in an undeveloped theater. This problem is 
defined by a limited capacity to move fuel ashore from tactical and seabased 
assets, coupled with increasing rates of end-user consumption. In the absence of 
host-nation support, sustaining the MEB during operations ashore requires joint 
interoperability of several fuel distribution systems and methods of resupply. The 
success of the seabased logistics network will depend on the use of a modern 
planning and forecasting approach. It is the aim of this study to understand the 
connection between the GCE’s operational behavior and its fuel demand. This is 
accomplished through the use of the MAGTF Power and Energy Model to create 
a fuel usage data set. Subsequent regression analysis reveals key trends and 
provides insight into how operational decisions can result in marginal changes to 
fuel demand. Finally, this study examines the feasibility of fuel movement ashore 
using only the ship-to-shore connectors available to the MEB. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
A.  PURPOSE ....................................................................................... 1 
B.  OBJECTIVES .................................................................................. 1 
C.  SCOPE ............................................................................................ 3 
II.  BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 5 
A.  STYLES OF WARFARE ................................................................. 5 
B.  EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21 ......................................................... 6 
C.  OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA AND SHIP 
TO OBJECTIVE MANEUVER ......................................................... 7 
D.  SHIP TO SHORE CONNECTORS .................................................. 8 
E.  OVER THE SHORE LOGISTICS .................................................. 10 
F.  SEABASING ................................................................................. 11 
G.  OPERATIONAL REACH ............................................................... 13 
H.  MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE CONCEPT AND 
EMPLOYMENT ............................................................................. 14 
I.  AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP AND MARINE 
EXPEDITIONARY UNIT ................................................................ 16 
J.  MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE ....................................... 18 
K.  BULK FUEL SYSTEMS ................................................................ 19 
III.  LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 21 
A.  MAGTF LIFT AND DISTRIBUTION CAPABILITY ........................ 21 
B.  REDUCTION OF FUEL EFFORTS ............................................... 22 
C.  SEABASED OPTIMIZATION EFFORTS ...................................... 23 
D.  OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVEL ................................. 24 
E.  FULLY BURDENED COST OF ENERGY ..................................... 25 
IV.  METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 27 
A.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH .............................. 27 
B.  MAGTF POWER AND ENERGY MODEL .................................... 28 
1.  Description ........................................................................ 28 
2.  Input Data .......................................................................... 28 
a.  System Data ........................................................... 29 
b.  Study Data .............................................................. 31 
3.  Strengths and Limitations ................................................ 32 
C.  ORDER OF BATTLE .................................................................... 32 
 viii
D.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ............................................................ 33 
1.  Phasing .............................................................................. 34 
2.  Force Mixes ....................................................................... 35 
3.  Utilization Rate .................................................................. 36 
4.  Operating Mode ................................................................ 37 
V.  DATA ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 39 
A.  SAMPLING ................................................................................... 39 
B.  REGRESSION MODELS .............................................................. 43 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................ 47 
A.  OVERVIEW ................................................................................... 47 
B.  OPERATIONAL INSIGHT ............................................................. 47 
1.  Behavior of the GCE Units ............................................... 47 
2.  Opportunities for Impact .................................................. 48 
3.  Force Mix Comparison ..................................................... 50 
4.  Ship to Shore Capacity Implications ............................... 52 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .................... 55 
D.  SUMMARY .................................................................................... 56 
APPENDIX A. TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE 
DATA ....................................................................................................... 59 
APPENDIX B. SUMMARY MPEM OUTPUT DATA ........................................... 71 
APPENDIX C. REGRESSION DATA AND COMPARISON ............................... 73 
A.  MAIN EFFECTS MODEL .............................................................. 73 
B.  MAIN EFFECTS + INTERACTION TERMS MODEL .................... 74 
C.  MAIN EFFECTS + POLYNOMIAL TERMS MODEL ..................... 75 
D.  MAIN EFFECTS + INTERACTION TERMS + POLYNOMIAL 
TERMS MODEL ............................................................................ 76 
APPENDIX D. CONNECTORS & CAPACITY CALCULATIONS ....................... 81 
APPENDIX E. FEASIBILITY OF SHIP TO SHORE FUEL MOVEMENT ........... 83 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 85 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................ 89 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Principles of Operational Maneuver from the Sea ........................... 7 
Figure 2.  Compositing and Employing the Scalable MEB ............................ 15 
Figure 3.  Location of MPSRONs .................................................................. 18 
Figure 4.  MPEM Data Structure .................................................................... 29 
Figure 5.  MEB GCE Order of Battle Demanding Connector Support. .......... 33 
Figure 6.  Operational Phase Timeline .......................................................... 35 
Figure 7.  Systematic Sampling Plan ............................................................. 40 
Figure 8.  Fuel Consumption Responses—Total GCE .................................. 41 
Figure 9.  Total GCE Scatterplot Matrix ......................................................... 43 
Figure 10.  Total GCE Three Dimensional Scatterplots ................................... 43 
Figure 11.  Regression Coefficients ................................................................. 46 
Figure 12.  Coefficient/Estimate of Means Measures ...................................... 48 
Figure 13.  Utilization Rate: Coefficient versus Demand Visualization ............ 50 
Figure 14.  Operating Mode: Coefficient versus Demand Visualization ........... 50 
Figure 15.  Force Mix Changes versus Demand Visualization ........................ 51 
Figure 16.  Model Feasibility Graph ................................................................. 54 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  MPEM Equipment Attributes ......................................................... 30 
Table 2.  Force Mix Composition .................................................................. 36 
Table 3.  Utilization Rate Distinction ............................................................. 36 
Table 4.  Operating Mode Distinction ........................................................... 37 
Table 5.  Regression Model Comparison ..................................................... 45 
Table 6.  Effect of Force Mix Changes on Demand ...................................... 51 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A2AD  Anti-Access/Area Denial 
AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
ACE  Aviation Combat Element 
ACV  Amphibious Combat Vehicle 
AE  Assault Echelon 
AFOE  Assault Follow On Element 
ARG  Amphibious Ready Group 
CBA  Capabilities Based Assessment 
CE  Command Element 
CEB Combat Engineer Battalion 
CLF Combat Logistics Force 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoE Department of Energy 
E2O Expeditionary Energy Office 
EF21  Expeditionary Force 21 
FBCE Fully Burdened Cost of Energy 
FBE Follow Behind Element 
GCE Ground Combat Element 
H&S Headquarters and Support 
HQ Headquarters 
LAV Light Armored Vehicle 
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
LCE Logistics Combat Element 
LCU Landing Craft Utility 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MANA Map Aware Non-uniform Automata 
MASS Mission Area Analysis Analytic Sustainment Suite 
MCCP Marine Corps Concept Paper 
MCRP Marine Corps Reference Publication 
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
 xiv
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force 
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MPEM MAGTF Power and Energy Model 
MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force 
MPSRON Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
OM Operating Mode 
SC(X)R Surface Connector (X) Recapitalization 
SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 
SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
SSC Ship-to-Shore Connector 
TAMCN Table of Authorized Material Control Number 
UR Utilization Rate 




The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is doctrinally advertised as 
capable of self-sustainment for 30 days using only the supplies embarked on 
ship. In reality, this capability is overstated and has been more realistically 
estimated to be seven days (Expeditionary Energy Office, 2015). This 23-day 
shortfall is reportedly due to the limited capacity of ship to shore connectors 
coupled with a recent tendency to field equipment with decreased fuel efficiency. 
Across the force, increasing energy demands are the result of decisions to 
prioritize force protection over resource efficiency.  
In an effort to close the sustainment gap and promote force extension, the 
Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O) has estimated that 17.5 percent of the 
aforementioned 23-day shortfall can be regained through changes in behavior 
alone (Expeditionary Energy Office, 2015). These changes may include, but are 
not limited to, the alteration of tactical plans, operating procedures, and force 
composition. Such alterations represent an acceptance of operational risk to buy 
down the foundational risk that the logistics network may be unable to sustain the 
combat forces. It is the purpose of this study to understand how the behavior of 
the MEB’s Ground Combat Element (GCE) affects fuel demand and operational 
reach. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
As the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication entitled Petroleum and Water 
Logistics Operations notes, “Commanders and their staffs at all levels must be 
concerned about maintaining water and fuel support through completion of the 
unit’s mission” (United States Marine Corps, 2005). The limitation of operational 
reach occurs when the system of suppliers fails to deliver on the fuel required by 
an end user. This forces the maneuver elements to culminate and lose the ability 
to be decisive of the battlefield. Decisions affecting this system carry significant 
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consequence, and so this report aims to meet the following objectives in an 
attempt to contribute to logistical planning in support of future amphibious 
operations.  
First, the connection between the GCE’s operational behavior and its fuel 
demand must be established. This component of the MEB is comprised of 
several units, each with a unique set of equipment tailored to provide the 
capabilities required by their tasks. Changes to the employment, tactics, and 
procedures of these units, therefore, would uniquely affect their respective fuel 
demands. Identifying trends amongst these effects could provide insight into how 
certain units behave compared to one another and the system as a whole. 
Second, this study seeks to identify changes to the GCE’s behavior that 
would yield the greatest opportunity to affect operational reach. The equipment 
characteristics of a given unit within the GCE might lead it to be more heavily 
influenced by certain types of changes to its usage than others. Similarly, a given 
change may affect certain units differently than others based on their equipment 
profiles.  
Third, force composition and amphibious landing plan alternatives is 
explored to identify opportunities to affect operational reach. The amphibious 
landing force is doctrinally tailored to accomplish its assigned mission in order to 
deliver an efficient, yet effective, force. This study will seek to identify how 
changes to the phased landing plan of the GCE may present opportunities to 
extend operational reach. 
Last, this thesis research seeks to determine the adequacy of the MEB’s 
connector capacity as it relates to fuel demand of the GCE. Given its advertised 
self-sustainment capability, the MEB must be able to move fuel ashore to its 
ground forces using organic assets. The feasibility of a fuel logistics network that 
is reliant on ship-to-shore connectors will be explored. 
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C. SCOPE 
This study intends to discuss issues and challenges that may exist during 
a MEB amphibious landing in a non-permissive A2/AD threat environment using 
assets that will be available in 2024. According to recent doctrinal concepts, such 
as that described by Expeditionary Force 21, the MEB will be the “centerpiece of 
an expeditionary force in readiness”, and thus will be the focus of this report 
(United States Marine Corps, 2014, p. 14). These same concepts detail the need 
for a force that can assure littoral access despite considerable threats that seek 
to deny that ability. The principles of Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Ship-
to-Objective Maneuver, and Seabasing offer guidance for operating in these 
threat environments and call for a tailored combat force ashore that is supported 
by a seabased logistics network (Department of the Navy, 1988; United States 
Marine Corps, 1996; United States Marine Corps, 2011). The majority of this 
discussion focuses solely on GCE fuel consumption without specific regard for 
the other MEB units and classes of supply that may impact logistics planning. 
Further limitations of the scope of this study are presented as applicable. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. STYLES OF WARFARE 
While attrition warfare seeks to destroy the enemy’s physical assets, the 
goal of maneuver warfare is to destroy the enemy’s ability to function as a 
coordinated system. This style of warfare has fundamentally changed the way we 
approach enemy strengths and how we define their vulnerabilities. An attrition 
approach would regard an enemy’s strength as something that must be 
addressed and defeated directly through the careful application of advantageous 
force ratios and combat power. The ability to coordinate and control efforts, 
therefore, is critical to our ability to have success against an enemy surface or 
strength. Accordingly, an attrition style lends itself to centralized control to 
coordinate the efforts of multiple arms to achieve the significant combat power 
necessary to destroy the enemy’s critical assets. Success in attrition is defined in 
terms of enemy troops killed/captured, equipment destroyed, and territory 
controlled. The effort to sustain a force which aims to conduct this style of 
warfare prioritizes durability and capacity over speed and flexibility (United States 
Marine Corps, 1997b).  
Maneuver warfare, on the other hand, centers around the careful 
identification and exploitation of the enemy’s weakness based on our 
understanding of their system. It is intended to be accomplished through the use 
of speed, focus, surprise, and boldness. Success in maneuver warfare is defined 
by the inability of the enemy to act systematically (United States Marine Corps, 
1997b). As the USMC Doctrinal Publication Warfighting summarizes, 
Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter 
the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and 
unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly 
deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. (United 
States Marine Corps, 1997b, p. 73) 
In future operating environments, the Marine Corps will continue to face 
many of the same challenges and obstacles that gave rise to the tenets of 
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maneuver warfare. Our style of warfare must prioritize the ability to thrive in 
uncertain and dynamic environments where opportunities are short lived (United 
States Marine Corps, 1997b). Given the dichotomy between the American 
people’s moral imperative to take action and their ever-shrinking appetite for 
prolonged conflict, Marines must be prepared to act both immediately and 
decisively. In short notice crisis response scenarios, Marines must be armed with 
a doctrine that allows them to “win quickly against a larger foe on his home soil 
with minimal casualties and limited external support” (United States Marine 
Corps, 1997b, p. 72). 
B. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21 
Published in 2014, EF21 provides vision and strategy for the Marine Corps 
in the twenty first century. It aims to provide goals and aspirations toward which 
the force can strive as it transitions from OIF/OEF with an eye toward addressing 
future operational challenges. EF21 and previous operating concepts reinforce 
the main missions of maintaining the abilities to respond to crisis and assure 
littoral access (United States Marine Corps, 2014). With over 80 percent of the 
global population living within one hundred miles of the coast, anti-access/area 
denial in the littorals is considered to be a rapidly growing global security threat 
(United States Marine Corps, 2014). The ability of the Marine Corps to fulfill its 
future mission requirements, therefore, relies on its ability to operate effectively in 
these areas.  
To develop into a force with the necessary capabilities and capacity to 
succeed, EF21 sets forth a multi-faceted approach that aims to make the Marine 
Corps the “right force in the right place at the right time” (United States Marine 
Corps, 2014). Focus areas outlined in this approach include timeliness, 
scalability, and naval force integration. The forward posturing of one third of the 
operating forces will enable Marines to decrease the nation’s crisis response 
time. Stressing the concept of scalability and tailoring forces to meet mission 
requirements is critical to avoiding wasteful excess that slows the force and 
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decreases flexibility. Most importantly, the approach calls for naval force 
integration that will allow for effective maneuver and indefinite seabased 
sustainment. In short, EF21 works to reinforce the tenets of maneuver warfare 
and apply them to the future littoral combat environment in which Marines will be 
expected to succeed. It asserts that the force can develop the necessary 
capabilities through organizational refinement, forward posturing, increased naval 
integration, and enhanced littoral maneuver capability (United States Marine 
Corps, 2014). 
C. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA AND SHIP TO 
OBJECTIVE MANEUVER 
The importance of dominating the littorals was not a new concept in 2014, 
but rather EF21 served partially to reinforce earlier doctrine and concepts that 
had lost importance during the OIF/OEF years. In 1996, MCCP 1–0 Operational 
Maneuver from the Sea collected and synthesized these ideas to present a 
unified document that conveyed their importance to U.S. success in the face of 
future security challenges. Figure 1 is a summary of these principles. 
Figure 1.  Principles of Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
 
Source: United States Marine Corps. Operational maneuver from the sea (MCCP 
1). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1996. 
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The Marine Corps adapted these principles from maneuver warfare, 
applied them to the littorals, and later integrated them into EF21. The strength of 
these concepts lies in the opportunities they present by using the sea as an 
operational maneuver space. This allows our forces to gain advantageous 
positioning while simultaneously limiting the methods by which an enemy can 
challenge or threaten our position. In turn, the force is able to generate tempo 
and maintain momentum by quickly deploying significant combat power ashore 
across the globe. The sea is an area in which the U.S. enjoys a significant 
superiority in both equipment and competency. Operational Maneuver from the 
Sea presents numerous ideas for how we can leverage that advantage to apply 
the tenets of maneuver warfare across the globe.  
The related concept of Ship to Objective Maneuver, originally published in 
1997, provided additional ideas aiming to enhance Operational Maneuver from 
the Sea. Firstly, Ship to Objective Maneuver calls for the use of seabasing to limit 
the footprint ashore (United States Marine Corps, 2011). The idea is that the only 
forces that should go ashore are those specifically task organized to accomplish 
the given mission (United States Marine Corps, 2011). All other functions such as 
command and control, logistics, and fires should be kept at sea to the greatest 
possible extent (United States Marine Corps, 2011). By reducing the number of 
noncombat forces ashore, we limit the availability and ease with which the enemy 
may target friendly forces. Keeping these functions at sea provides a greater 
degree of protection and could eleviate certain political pressures. Secondly, the 
concept stresses the importance of force dispersion to avoid the adversary’s 
ability to target and mass efforts on friendly forces. In the littoral environment, this 
means the use of multiple entry points and an emphasis on flexibility, speed, and 
decentralized coordination. 
D. SHIP TO SHORE CONNECTORS 
The physical act of moving personnel and equipment from the ship on 
which they are embarked to the shore on which they must fight is a complicated 
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matter. The movement or maneuver of these assets must be accomplished 
through the use of landing craft, assault amphibian vehicle, or helicopters 
deployed from supporting ships. Each of these means of transportation carries 
with it vulnerabilities and limitations, but also unique advantages and strengths.  
The effectiveness of helicopters is dependent on weather conditions, 
weight and range limitations, high fuel usage, and maintenance requirements. 
Additionally, while helicopters are capable of landing in unimproved areas 
ashore, landing at sea is restricted to certain ship decks with varying degrees of 
congestion. The advantages they provide, however, are that they provide speed 
and flexibility that surpass that of ground assets, the ability to bypass obstacles, 
and the ability to conduct operations when sea states prohibit the use of landing 
craft and amphibious vehicles (Department of the Navy, 1988). Their ability to 
transport supplies from source directly to user without the need for intermediate 
nodes makes them a more efficient means with regard to time and manpower.  
In its current inventory, the Marine Corps uses the MV-22 and CH-53 as 
airborne connectors. The MV-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor aircraft capable of vertical 
take-off and landing. This capability grants it considerable employment flexibility 
as it can take off and land like a helicopter while reaching flight speeds typically 
seen in a fixed wing aircraft. As an airborne connector, this means that the MV-
22 has a range that makes it capable of transporting personnel and supplies from 
an over the horizon seabase. This increased stand-off distance makes the 
seabase less vulnerable to various A2/AD threats. While the MV-22 is an 
effective mover of personnel and light equipment, its limited cargo capacity 
restricts its effectiveness in supply transportation operations (United States 
Marine Corps, 2000). 
The CH-53E Super Stallion is currently being replaced by the CH-53K for 
use in the movement of heavy equipment and supplies from ship to shore. This 
platform follows a more traditional rotary helicopter design and thus has a more 
limited range and over the horizon capability as compared to the MV-22. What it 
lacks in range, however, it makes up for by having almost triple the cargo 
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carrying capacity as compared to the Osprey (United States Marine Corps, 
2015). A more detailed summary of the specifications of both airborne 
connectors can be found in Appendix D. 
Waterborne ship to shore movement takes place via various classes of 
landing craft. In its current inventory, the Marine Corps employs the LCU and 
LCAC. These small vessels are limited by sea state conditions, the suitability of 
the coastline and beaches for landing, anti-access obstacles like mines, and the 
availability of well deck space. Landing crafts, when compared to airborne 
assets, provide increased fuel efficiency and cargo capacity but fall short in 
speed and flexibility of employment. The replacement of both of these platforms 
is imminent. The SC(X)R is projected to replace the LCU in 2222. The SSC is 
projected to replace the LCAC in late 2020. Both replacements are upgrades 
aimed at improving capability to fit the future needs of the force while driving 
down long term operations and support costs (Eckstein, 2015). 
Together, a mix of both surface and air methods to support ship to shore 
movement builds a limited degree of resiliency into the system. Both methods, 
however, are vulnerable to weather and highly correlated fluctuations in sea state 
(Department of the Navy, 1988). 
E. OVER THE SHORE LOGISTICS 
In practice, the movement of supplies, equipment, and personnel from 
ship to shore has been accomplished on many occasions with varying degrees of 
success. Historically, our ability to sustain the combat forces ashore has entailed 
the offloading and build-up of all classes of supply at ports. For the most part, this 
has proven to be a long arduous process that often required port improvement 
and construction efforts. Logisticians then focused on stockpiling and staging as 
much as possible ashore to meet the considerable needs of the maneuver forces 
as they sustained combat operations. In effect, this process created a huge 
logistical footprint, which is often referred to as an “Iron Mountain” (Born, 1998). 
This sort of large stagnant storage area is undesirable for two main reasons. 
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First, it represents a considerable security challenge, which the commander must 
address by tasking combat forces to protect the logistics staging area (United 
States Marine Corps, 1996). This detracts from the force’s ability to act decisively 
elsewhere in the area of operations and thus it may inherently damage the 
likelihood of tactical success. Second, a great deal of time, resources, and effort 
are expended in building the “Iron Mountain.” The quantity of goods moved 
ashore is prioritized over the actual needs of the maneuver elements, resulting in 
a certain degree of effort which adds no value to the forces’ ability to accomplish 
the given mission (United States Marine Corps, 1996). As summarized by 
Operational Maneuver From The Sea, 
For most of the 20th century, the usefulness of sea-based logistics 
was limited by the voracious appetite of modern landing forces for 
such items as fuel, large caliber ammunition, and aviation 
ordnance. As a result, the options available to landing forces were 
greatly reduced by the need to establish, protect, and make use of 
supply dumps. Concerted efforts were delayed and opportunities 
for decisive action missed while the necessary supplies 
accumulated on shore. (United States Marine Corps, 1996, p. 5) 
The concept of Over the Shore logistics, attempts to remove this sort of 
inefficiency that detracts from the accomplishment of the supported objective(s). 
By conducting logistics “over the shore” rather than “to the shore,” the force can 
avoid the necessity for an “Iron Mountain” by distributing the necessary goods 
closer to the end user. Ideally, supplies could be delivered directly from the 
source to the end user for consumption. The elimination of intermediary nodes 
from the system would greatly enhance efficiency and timeliness while reducing 
security concerns and vulnerability. 
F. SEABASING 
To perform Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Over the Shore 
Logistics, we must continue to understand, execute, and develop the seabasing 
techniques that make them possible. Seabasing seeks to reduce the necessity 
for a large footprint ashore, eliminate reliance on port infrastructure, and avoid 
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many of the political restrictions on what can or cannot be done on other nations’ 
sovereign land (Department of the Navy, 2010). It works to relocate, to the 
greatest extent possible, the proverbial “Iron Mountain” from the vulnerable shore 
to the relative security of a network of platforms such as Carrier Strike Groups, 
Amphibious Readiness Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units, Expeditionary Strike 
Groups, Amphibious Forces, and Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons 
(Department of the Navy, 2010). Through the placement of these assets and 
resources aboard ships, the Combat Service Support Area becomes a mobile 
distribution network capable of providing sustainment while tailoring its method 
and route of delivery. In addition to sustainment capability, effective seabasing is 
capable of at sea transfer, selective offload, austere access, command and 
control, force projection ashore, maritime strike, seabase defense, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance, and medical support (Department of the Navy, 
2010). All of these functions previously required a significant number of troops 
and equipment ashore, adding to the Combat Service Support Area footprint. 
The effectiveness of seabasing is largely dependent on the quality of 
information that is being communicated and acted upon. Despite its many 
downsides, a large footprint ashore allows for resiliency in the face of uncertainty 
and demand fluctuations. If a maneuver unit were to experience an immediate 
unforeseen need for a given class of supply, they have the comfort of knowing 
that the supplies are available using proven ground transportation networks. This 
describes the characteristics of a “push” logistics system in which supplies are 
sent forward based on projected requirements (United States Marine Corps, 
1997a). When sustainment is coming from the sea, however, these maneuver 
units must accurately communicate the supplies that they need. This will require 
the integration of a naval total asset visibility or common logistical picture system 
in which end user demand is quickly and accurately communicated to the 
seabase suppliers (United States Marine Corps, 2014).  
To be successful, the strengths of both approaches must be leveraged. 
The resiliency afforded by maintaining a readily accessible inventory ashore is 
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advantageous in the face of dynamic demand rates. Such an inventory should 
not be so large, however, so as to represent a significant vulnerability. 
Conversely, the flexibility and security afforded by seabased sustainment is 
advantageous in that it magnifies the availability of combat power dedicated to 
the mission, untethers the user from traditional lines of communication, and 
permits the use of tempo and speed to seize initiative in combat.  
Similar to the nature of the styles of war (attrition and maneuver), the 
methods of sustainment cannot exist in a pure sense. A purely seabased 
approach with no inventory ashore is extremely vulnerable in the face of weather 
and sea state fluctuations, for example. As the maneuver forces project further 
inland, this effect grows as airborne connectors must travel greater distances and 
surface connector landing sites are further from the end users. An appreciation 
for the strengths and weaknesses of logistical approaches is fundamental to 
building a system which supports and compliments the maneuver element that is 
accomplishing the assigned mission.  
G. OPERATIONAL REACH 
As defined by the Army’s FM 3–0 Operations, operational reach is “the 
distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military 
capabilities” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 6.15). The ability to employ 
military capabilities across a given distance is much more than simply being 
present in a given geographical area. It implies that the force has the assets and 
resources necessary to take the actions necessary to ensure success upon 
arrival. The duration component of the definition signals that if the force is unable 
to sustain its activities indefinitely, its operational reach is inherently limited.  
Maneuver warfare and the methods of sustainment in support of 
amphibious operations that have been previously discussed all aim, in some 
way, to extend operational reach. Every military commander throughout history 
has wished that his or her force were able to move faster and further while 
fighting harder for longer. Exhaustive planning and operational design can extend 
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operational reach through tempo management and phasing approaches. 
Examples of technological innovation’s effect on operational reach throughout 
history are abundant. While technological developments, such as air assets, 
have allowed our forces to extend the distance component of operational reach, 
they are limited by the duration component. An aircraft may be able to travel 
hundreds of miles, but without consistent fuel resupply it is unable to successfully 
employ military capabilities upon arrival. On the other hand, a thin-skinned and 
fuel efficient troop carrier might be able to travel a great distance relatively 
quickly. However, without adequate force protection measure like armor it too 
may be unable to employ military capabilities upon arrival. A heavily fortified tank 
with an impressive weapon system will certainly be able to provide impressive 
combat power, but will be severely limited in distance and duration measures. 
These three components of operational reach (distance, duration, and capability) 
are in constant contention and thus require tradeoffs be made between them to 
arrive at a level of operational reach that satisfies the overall mission 
requirements. 
H. MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE CONCEPT AND EMPLOYMENT 
Expeditionary Force 21 sets forth a new vision for the employment of 
Marine Air Ground Task Forces. Traditionally, in response to a significant crisis, 
Marine Expeditionary Brigades would embark aboard amphibious shipping and 
move to the area of operations. Once in theater, they would combine with 
prepositioned assets and fight as a Marine Expeditionary Force (United States 
Marine Corps, 2014). This concept was executed in Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm and Task Force 58 to deliver a formidable force with 
extensive capabilities in support of major campaigns (United States Marine 
Corps, 2014).  
Moving forward, however, Expeditionary Force 21 strives to deliver more 
scalable, flexible, and forward postured response capabilities to the respective 
Geographic Combatant Commander. To that end, it seeks to constitute MEBs 
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forward from Special MAGTFs and Marine Expeditionary Units already deployed. 
As summarized by Marine Expeditionary Brigade Concept of Operations,  
Deploy as SPMAGTFs and MEUs for steady-state engagement 
activities and crisis response, composite forward into a MEB for 
more significant crises and contingencies, expand the MEB into a 
MEF to fight major operations and campaigns. (United States 
Marine Corps, 2014, p. 24) 
This sort of organizational focus on a scalable response capability will 
drastically shorten reaction time when necessary. It prioritizes a tailored 
response to deliver a force best suited to defeating the given threat. This 
operational design, as depicted in Figure 2, will serve to not only reduce 
response time, but also provide some extension of operational reach. 
Figure 2.  Compositing and Employing the Scalable MEB 
 
Source: United States Marine Corps. (2014). Expeditionary force 21, forward and 
ready: now and in the future. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps. 
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I. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP AND MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT 
The Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit is an “integrated 
naval formation primarily designed as a highly mobile, versatile, and self-
contained crisis response force” (Department of the Navy, 2014, p. 1.1). As such, 
the MEU is embarked aboard the three ARG ships to meet the required 
capabilities. Despite their advertisement as a “self-contained crisis response 
force,” the ARG/MEU concept assumes the logistical support of the Navy’s 
combat logistics ships. The following represent the typical composition of these 
forces. 
 
Amphibious Ready Group: 
 An Amphibious squadron commander and associated staff 
 Multipurpose or general purpose amphibious assault ship 
(LHA/LHD) 
 An amphibious transport dock (LPD) 
 A dock landing ship (LSD) 
 Navy force enablers (naval beach group detachment, beach part 
teams, etc.) 
Source: Department of the Navy. (2014). Disaggregated amphibious ready 
group/marine expeditionary unit concept of employment. Norfolk, VA: 
Department of the Navy. 
Marine Expeditionary Unit: 
 Command Element 
 Ground Combat Element 
 Aviation Combat Element 
 Logistics Combat Element 
Source: Department of the Navy. (2014). Disaggregated amphibious ready 
group/marine expeditionary unit concept of employment. Norfolk, VA: 
Department of the Navy. 
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Traditionally employed as a single entity, the ARG/MEU is certified to 
execute the following range of missions: 
 Amphibious Assault 
 Amphibious Raid 
 Visit, Board, Search and Seizure 
 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
 Stability Operations 
 Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel  
 Joint and Combined Operations 
 Theater Security Cooperation  
 Airfield/Port Seizure 
 Advanced Force Operations 
 Aviation Operations from Expeditionary Shore Based Sites 
Source: Department of the Navy. (2014). Disaggregated amphibious ready 
group/marine expeditionary unit concept of employment. Norfolk, VA: 
Department of the Navy. 
The ability to have such an extensive range of capability forward 
positioned is a valuable asset to the geographic combatant commander. 
Particularly when married with the Expeditionary Strike Group, the concept 
provides a crisis response force that is both capable and credible.  
Occasionally, geographic combatant commanders have found it 
advantageous to disaggregate, or split, the ARG/MEU forces. While this is not 
the preferred method of employment, it may allow for the simultaneous 
accomplishment of smaller missions which pose lesser risk to the force. A 
disaggregated force will not carry with it the full spectrum of capabilities and will 
require additional supporting assets. Thus, the decision to disaggregate the 
ARG/MEU is intended to be temporary rather than a static state of operations 
(Department of the Navy, 2014). 
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J. MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE  
Given the updated MAGTF concept of employment in which MEBs will be 
composited forward, prepositioned equipment and capabilities will play a major 
role in reducing reaction time and sustaining the force. The Maritime 
Prepositioning Force is a critical component of our ability to maintain a forward 
posture while remaining capable of considerable power projection when 
necessary. The basic unit of the Maritime Prepositioning Force is the Maritime 
Prepositioning Ship Squadron (MPSRON). Three such squadrons are 
consistently afloat near the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia, and Guam. Together, 
the MPSRONs are composed of 16 ships that are broken into the three 
squadrons (Figure 3) (United States Marine Corps, 2004).  
Figure 3.  Location of MPSRONs 
 
Source: United States Marine Corps. (2010). MAGTF planner's reference 
manual. Quantico, VA: MAGTF Staff Training Program. 
In the past, the role of MPF assets was to augment and enable the 
MAGTF in its amphibious operations, specifically in the construction of the 
logistical footprint ashore (United States Marine Corps, 2004). With the 
improvements and focus on seabasing, however, they become an integral part of 
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seabasing operations. With considerable, and ever-improving, off-load/on-load 
capabilities, planners intend to use these platforms as everything from troop 
berthing and planning spaces to flight decks and warehouses (United States 
Marine Corps, 2014). In principle, the “Iron Mountain” of traditional amphibious 
logistics support will be relocated aboard the MPSRON and ARG ships to form 
the seabased combat support staging area. 
K.  BULK FUEL SYSTEMS 
Among the greatest limiting factors of operational reach is fuel. It is often 
described as the “tether” or “leash” that limits the progress of the maneuver 
elements (Baas, 2012). This effect is continually magnified as the MEB grows 
heavier and more powerful. The delivery of fuel from seabase to the end user 
poses unique challenges that differ from the delivery of other classes of supply. 
As Marine Corps Order 3900.19 asserts, 
seventy percent of the logistics required to sustain Marine Corps 
expeditionary forces ashore is fuel and water. A Marine infantry 
company today uses more fuel than an entire infantry battalion did 
in 2001. This increase in demand for “liquid logistics” constrains 
operations. (United States Marine Corps, 2013, p. 1) 
As a liquid, transporting fuel typically requires a vessel, tank, or container 
in which to be transported. When transported in discrete increments, the 
movement of any sizeable amount of fuel requires exhaustive effort and a high 
volume of transportation assets. Every effort, therefore, is made to move fuel in 
bulk. The development and use of pipeline systems has proven effective, but 
only over finite distances.  
In support of MEB amphibious operations in a non-permissive littoral 
environment with significant anti-access/area denial threat, the risk associated 
with the preferred method of bulk fuel transportation via pipeline is likely to prove 
unacceptable. The threat of mines and/or anti-ship cruise missiles is likely to be 
significant in any future littoral combat environment (United States Marine Corps, 
2014). Anchoring a ship, like the Off-Shore Petroleum Distribution System, right 
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off the coast while it pumps the necessary fuel to an inland storage facility is too 
risky. This sort of operation would only be feasible in an extremely permissive 
environment where the threat ashore is sufficiently nullified. As documents like 
Expeditionary Force 21 illustrate, future conflict response scenarios will likely be 
chaotic, uncertain, and asymmetric (United States Marine Corps, 2014). A plan to 
support MEB operations ashore from a seabasing platform, therefore, must be 
executable in such an environment.  
Accordingly, the same airborne and waterborne connectors used to 
transport and distribute the other classes of supply must have the capability to 
move fuel to the end users. A variety of unique drums, bladders, and pump 
systems exist with limited interfacing capability and interoperability. These 
systems, while innovative, lack the capacity to efficiently resupply and sustain the 
forces ashore. Even with the most innovative solutions, the capacity of 
connectors to provide fuel to the maneuver force is unable to match the efficiency 
with which a pipeline system can operate. There exists a mismatch between the 
desire of the maneuver commander to execute operations in accordance with the 
principles of maneuver warfare and the ability of the logistician to distribute fuel 
to him in a similar fashion (Perry, Euller, Kavanagh, & Salcedo, 2012). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Numerous studies and various research methods have focused on the 
issues surrounding the Marine Corps’ vision for efficient operational logistics in 
support of amphibious operations. This has resulted in a relatively 
comprehensive approach to a complex system and its associated challenges. As 
doctrinal concept and technological innovation progress, it is critical that these 
efforts continue to help understand and mitigate these challenges and meet the 
given operational requirements. 
A. MAGTF LIFT AND DISTRIBUTION CAPABILITY 
The Marine Corps’ Logistics Vision and Strategy Branch recently 
sponsored a two year study to analyze the capacity of current and future MEUs 
to meet the logistical lift and distribution capabilities of ship-to-shore connectors 
as demanded by the EF21 concept. To that end, the study first needed to 
establish a baseline table of equipment around which it could center further 
analysis. After collecting the available data from 11 MEUs between May 2009 
and August 2013, the study found the data to be “not suitable for studying 
logistics capabilities” (United States Marine Corps, 2015, p. iii). This is indicative 
of a service wide, perhaps DoD wide, shortfall in established data collection 
practices. Without complete historical data the study found that the best 
approach would be to composite an EDL based on 2024 MEU baseline as 
established by the Annual Report for Afloat MAGTF Requirements (United States 
Marine Corps, 2012).  
Overall, the study aimed to accomplish three primary objectives. Primarily, 
it aimed to determine the adequacy of MEU lift and distribution capabilities. Given 
a realistic situation the study undertook an extensive modeling effort that 
summarized the MEU’s ability to internally meet its sustainment requirements. 
Second, the study worked to identify potential gaps and shortfalls between 
current capabilities and those required by EF21. Finally, recommendations were 
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made regarding the development and implantation of planning tools to support 
amphibious operational logistics (United States Marine Corps, 2015). 
The modeling effort was conducted using a suite of five models known 
collectively as the Mission Area Analysis Analytic Sustainment Suite (MASS). 
Using the data from each model to feed into the others allowed for the 
development of sustainment requirements, intermodal supply embarkation plans, 
and finally ship-to-objective delivery plans. The lift and distribution study 
concluded that the MEU had sufficient lift capability to meet the demands of the 
EF21 concept, but only when the logistics network and assets were managed 
correctly. When employed appropriately, MASS “enables the analyst to; rapidly 
identify the time required to complete a movement, the number of connectors by 
type required, and the effects distance and container type/number have on the 
mission” (United States Marine Corps, 2015, p. 13). 
One of the key shortfalls identified by the lift and distribution study is the 
lack of use and availability of tools like MASS to amphibious logistics planners in 
the operating forces (United States Marine Corps, 2015). The study does find, 
however, that the use of MASS is valuable once given the availability of force 
data such as number of personnel, equipment quantities by specific type, and 
fuel and water consumption factors (United States Marine Corps, 2015). With 
respect to fuel consumption, the lift and distribution study states the planning 
assumption of all vehicles operating at eight hours per day. The quality of this 
input data, therefore, will affect the usability of the output landing plans.  
B. REDUCTION OF FUEL EFFORTS 
Additional efforts have been made to study the way ship-to-shore 
connectors use fuel with the aim of “improving energy efficiency of a MEB during 
an amphibious landing prior to an A2AD mission” (Super Group Cohort 311-
122O, 2013, p. xix). When operating in a non-permissive environment, the 
availability of bulk fuel that can be used in support of the landing force may be 
limited. One way to mitigate this challenge is to reduce the fuel used to deliver 
 23
troops, supplies, and equipment ashore in order to make more available for 
maneuver units. 
The work conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School by Super Group 
Cohort 311–122O concluded with several important findings. Primarily through a 
discrete event modeling approach, the study found that fuel savings were directly 
proportional to seabase distance and sea state (Super Group Cohort 311-122O, 
2013). Additionally, it identified the LCAC and MV-22 as having “the most 
significant negative effects on overall fuel efficiency during the mission” (Super 
Group Cohort 311-122O, 2013, p. xxiv). On the other hand, it acknowledges the 
benefits of the LCAC during the amphibious assault phase due to its unique 
flexibility of employment in an A2/AD environment (Super Group Cohort 311-
122O, 2013). Ultimately, the study recommends the mitigation of fuel inefficient 
practices through “operational workarounds, such as decreasing Seabase 
Standoff Distance, and employing LCUs in place of LCACs” (Super Group Cohort 
311-122O, 2013, p. xxiv). 
C. SEABASED OPTIMIZATION EFFORTS 
In light of the lift and distribution capacity, as well as fuel availability 
restrictions, several efforts have been made optimize the seabased sustainment 
system. Such efforts are often limited in scope and affected by the 
aforementioned unavailability of complete data of high quality (United States 
Marine Corps, 2015). The importance of seabased logistics as an area of study 
was downgraded during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the late 1990s, 
however, STOM and SeaBasing were being embraced as concepts critical to the 
future success of the Marine Corps. During that time period, several studies 
centered on concerns about the MAGTF’s ability to sustain operations ashore. 
A 2001 study conducted at NPS, for example, aimed to assess the ability 
of an LHD class ship to meet the various supply needs of a force ashore using a 
ship to objective design. The study models and simulates a seabased logistics 
network and analyzes its ability to meet the demands of the force during three 
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operational scenarios. The results found that “a substantial increase in the 
number of aircraft, operational availability of those aircraft, and/or a substantial 
reduction in sustainment requirements are needed in order to successfully 
accomplish the stated scenarios” (Bryan, 2001, p. v). 
Recently, studies that center on the effectiveness of amphibious 
operations have once again increased in frequency and importance as a result of 
the drawdown of forces from Afghanistan and Iraq. One such study, conducted at 
NPS in 2015 aimed to inform the development and employment of future combat 
systems using a combat simulation approach of an amphibious raid scenario 
(Parker Jr., 2015). The author’s findings make strong arguments for the 
increased use of self-deploying systems like AAVs (or perhaps the future ACVs) 
while also identifying practices that would, in effect, result in significant fuel cost 
savings (Parker Jr., 2015). Through the use of a combat simulation approach, the 
author’s analysis is made credible and relevant by its focus on success on the 
battlefield. 
D. OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVEL 
For any amphibious force to be supported, the larger naval and defense 
logistics networks must function efficiently. The Combat Logistics Force (CLF) is 
the U.S. Navy’s worldwide sustainment fleet. Thorough optimization efforts, like 
that conducted by Brown & Carlyle in 2008, aim to ensure that the CLF is 
capable of supporting combatant ships and thus remove the necessity for them 
to return to port. The insight gained from CLF models is also valuable in the 
systems acquisition process as it informs ship capability and requirement 
decisions.  
The U.S. also maintains a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) through 
which it manages several stockpiles across the globe. Numerous studies have 
sought to optimize the location and quantity of petroleum products that are being 
held with regards to operational planning and global markets (Teisberg, 1981). 
Others have debated the very existence of the SPR, arguing that the high 
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maintenance and acquisition costs far outweigh the overstated benefits (Taylor & 
Van Doren, 2005).  
The efficient management of large networks like the CLF and SPR 
represent opportunities for DoD and DoE planners to extend the operational 
reach of the U.S. military as a whole. These calculations are ultimately the 
product of lower level fuel demand signals.  
E. FULLY BURDENED COST OF ENERGY 
Since 2011 the inclusion of the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) in 
calculations which support of acquisition decisions has been mandatory (Doerry, 
2013). This cost is the product of uniform methods developed by the various 
System Commands (Doerry, 2013). The calculations proposed by Doerry in 2013 
work to accurately calculate the FBCE as it relates to surface ships. It relies 
primarily on annual energy usage and operational profile development, to include 
the fuel consumed by embarked vehicles and equipment (Doerry, 2013). Errors 
or inaccuracies that are made at even the lowest level of energy planning could 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH 
Primary Question: 
What is the relationship between the GCE’s operational behavior and its 
fuel consumption?  
Given the limited capacity of ship to shore connectors to move bulk fuel in 
a non-permissive littoral environment, the logistics network supporting the EF21 
concept must be managed intelligently to meet demand. Currently, as noted by 
the MAGTF lift and distribution study, “there is a complete lack of logistics 
planning and execution tools in the operating forces” (United States Marine 
Corps, 2015). The study concludes that, given complete and accurate data, 
MASS represents the sort of tool that can help manage the complex EF21 
logistics network (United States Marine Corps, 2015). In order to further address 
this research question, this study aims to evaluate one method by which the input 
data can be improved with respect to fuel demand. The quality of the landing and 
support plans is a direct reflection of the integrity of the input data. Through the 
use and application of MPEM, planners may be able to improve the accuracy 
with which they forecast fuel usage over the course of operations ashore. Once 
the strengths and limitations of MPEM are understood, significant conclusions 
may be drawn about how operational decisions can result in marginal changes to 
fuel demand. This insight may help decision makers and logistics planners to 








1. What changes to the GCE’s behavior would yield the greatest 
opportunities to increase the MEB’s operational reach? 
2. What force composition and amphibious landing plan alternatives 
present opportunities to increase the MEB’s operational reach? 
3. Do the MEB’s connectors have sufficient capacity to support the 
fuel demand of the GCE ashore? 
 
B. MAGTF POWER AND ENERGY MODEL  
1. Description 
Written in Visual Basic for Applications and embedded in Microsoft Excel, 
MPEM is a deterministic modeling tool. It calculates the fuel consumption and 
electrical consumption/generation of an operational unit over time. The model is 
customizable and can be tailored to reflect just about any MAGTF operational 
scenario. The integration into the Microsoft Excel platform means that it can be 
used with ease by users of varying technical abilities. In comparison to the 
planning factors and ad hoc methods that are commonly used in the operating 
forces, MPEM offers a more comprehensive and detailed approach to forecasting 
energy demand (Group W, 2014). 
2. Input Data 
As shown in Figure 4, MPEM driven by a data that belongs to either the 
system or study category. In general, the system data refers to the technical 
specifications of equipment and the composition of units involved. Study data, on 
the other hand, is composed of operational data such as deployment information 
and operational activity (Group W, 2014). 
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Figure 4.  MPEM Data Structure 
 
Source: Group W. (2014). MAGTF power & energy model (v3.1) user's guide. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
a. System Data 
(1) Tables of Organization 
The user is able to upload or build a set of units that will consist of the 
operating forces for the model. Once established, each unit is assigned the 
appropriate equipment and personnel which will define its unique energy usage 
characteristics. The units can later be sorted and filtered by combat element (CE, 
GCE, ACE, etc.) or function (infantry, artillery, tanks, etc.) for analytical purposes. 
Only the equipment and personnel assigned to a unit will impact its energy usage 
calculations. The element or function to which a unit is assigned will not impact 
its energy usage. This information is categorical in nature but it does not assume 
 30
anything about the operational differences between units of different functions 
(Group W, 2014). 
(2) Equipment 
Similar to the tables of organization, MPEM allows the user to upload or 
build a database of equipment that can be assigned to the operational units. 
Each equipment type, commonly identified using the alphanumeric TAMCN, will 
not affect energy demand until it is attached to a unit. Each equipment type is 
defined by thirty different attributes that will define its energy profile. For 
purposes of this study, a few important attributes are described in Table 1 (Group 
W, 2014). 
Table 1.   MPEM Equipment Attributes 
Gallons Per Hour 
Base 






Electrical consumption of the equipment per hour. This 
affects fuel usage  indirectly as equipment that 
consumes electricity, but not fuel, will impact the 
calculations used for power generating equipment and 
battery use. 
Percent Use Percentage of the equipment that is deployed that is in 
daily use. Changes to the percent use attribute can be 
used to reflect typical maintenance rates, etc. 
Hours Per Day Defines the number of hours that the equipment is 
operating in a given 24 hour period. This can be 
considered as part of operational tempo in that the more 
active a unit is, the more hours per day its equipment 
will be operating. 
Percent Low 
Operating Mode 
Many equipment types consume energy at much 
different rates depending on if they are running in low or 
high operating modes. For example, laptops can go into 
sleep mode and vehicles can idle in order to save 
energy. This too can be interpreted as a component of 
operational tempo as the more a unit fights, maneuvers, 
or even processes information, the less its equipment is 
in low operating mode. The ratio of fuel used in low and 
high modes is also among the equipment attributes. 
Source: Group W. (2014). MAGTF power & energy model (v3.1) user's guide. 
User's Manual, Washington D.C. 
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(3) Weather 
Weather data (low/high temperature and hours of sunlight) is included as 
input data because of the impact that temperature has on energy demand. 
Specifically, the model accounts for increased requirements for power generation 
when the temperature falls outside of the desired range (Group W, 2014). Among 
the many equipment attributes are gallons per hour and kilowatts per hour 
consumed by environmental control units used for heating or cooling. The model 
does not account, however, for the effect of air conditioning or heating in vehicles 
on fuel consumption (Group W, 2014). 
b. Study Data 
(1) Operational Phases 
The level of activity for the landing force and its logistics network depends 
largely on the operational phase. For example, the GCE will not use fuel at the 
same rate when it is conducting stability operations as when it is gaining a 
foothold. Accordingly, MPEM allows for the establishment of operational phases 
which can be given durations and unique equipment usage attributes. For 
purposes of this study, three operational phases were established; forced entry, 
surge, and sustain. The attributes of each phase were then altered to create 
more realistic data. 
(2) Deployment Phases 
Similarly, MPEM is designed to reflect MAGTF operations in which the 
force is phased ashore over time. These deployment phases can be likened to 
waves, echelons, or time periods in which certain units and their respective 
equipment is moved from ship to shore. Accordingly, a unit will not begin 
consuming fuel until it has been deployed. For purposes of this study, three 
deployment phases were established; Assault Echelon, Assault Follow-On 
Echelon, and Follow Behind Element. For a given unit in a given phase, its 
personnel and equipment is assumed to arrive at a constant rate throughout that 
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phase, with 100 percent of its assets ashore by the end of the deployment phase. 
For example, a company assigned to a deployment phase with a duration of four 
days would have 25 percent of its assets moved ashore each day. 
3. Strengths and Limitations 
The value of MPEM lies in its ability to account for a variety of technical 
characteristics and apply them in an operational context. Its approach is far more 
detailed than the alternative methods that have been used previously. The 
relative simplicity of the Microsoft Excel interface makes it a feasible tool for 
logistics planners in the operating forces. With minimal training and exposure, a 
Marine could customize MPEM to his/her unit and use it to forecast their unit’s 
fuel usage during its next training evolution or combat operation. On a grander 
scale, the output from an adequately constructed and maintained MPEM file can 
provide high fidelity data which, when used in conjunction with a tool like MASS, 
could result in a landing and support plan that mitigates many of the challenges 
associated with EF21 logistics. 
As a deterministic model, MPEM does not allow for the variation that will 
inevitably occur in real life operations. Applying a flat value for the hours per day 
that a certain equipment type will be used, for example, is unrealistic. Planners 
would be better aided by a tool that enabled them to understand the probable 
range of fuel demanded. With a stochastic model, one could establish, with a 
degree of confidence, a forecast for the quantity of fuel used during an operation. 
Due to its deterministic nature, MPEM only provides a single point estimate 
based solely on the input data. 
C. ORDER OF BATTLE 
Similar to the use of a 2024 MEU baseline in the MAGTF Lift & 
Distribution study, a 2024 MEB baseline has been established and used in 
various studies and war gaming exercises (United States Marine Corps, 2012). 
This study uses the 2024 MEB Baseline GCE, as constructed by Group W in 
MPEM, as the basis for analysis. In keeping with the spirit of EF21 and 
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seabasing concepts, this approach assumes that all other combat elements are 
either operating from the sea or being supplied from a separate logistics network 
that does not involve ship to shore connector support. 
As depicted in Figure 5, the units that compose of the 2024 MEB Baseline 
GCE and thus represent the end users throughout this study. Not represented in 
Figure 5, but included in the GCE, is a small Division Headquarters Detachment 
which provides various ancillary support services outside of typical logistics 
functions such as chaplain, medical, and military police functions. 
Figure 5.  MEB GCE Order of Battle Demanding Connector Support.  
 
 
A comprehensive list of the equipment assigned to each of these units can 
be found by accessing the USMC Total Force Structure Management System. 
Collectively, these units, with their respective personnel and equipment, 
represent the combat power that must be landed and supported ashore during an 
amphibious assault operation. In an ideal EF21 amphibious assault operation, 
these units would draw supplies directly from ship to shore connectors without 
the need for a robust LCE footprint ashore.  
D. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
If operating forces are to use tools like MPEM to model and forecast their 
energy usage, they must be provided with a comprehensive understanding of 
how the various MPEM inputs affect fuel demand in an operational scenario. 
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Such an approach may help to improve the precision with which future studies 
model low level fuel consumption. Otherwise, the generalized data provided by 
many planning factors sources may mislead planners into the formulation of 
misguided policies. To this end, the following describes a systematic 
manipulation of MPEM inputs that aims to yield insights that may work toward 
extension of the MAGTF’s operational reach. 
1. Phasing 
As depicted by Figure 6, this study is based on a hypothetical amphibious 
operation in which the GCE is brought ashore in three deployment phases which 
coincide with three operational phases. The forced entry phase lasts four days 
and involves the landing of the AE. The surge phase lasts seven days and 
involves the introduction of the AFOE while the AE continues to operate ashore. 
Finally, the sustain phase lasts 19 days and deploys the FBE while the AE and 
AFOE continue to operate. This approach represents the reality that the MEB will 
require different capabilities over time to match the range of military operations 
that it is likely to conduct during a given amphibious landing. In total, this 
scenario matches the advertised 30-day self-sustainment window of the MEB 
and deploys all GCE units. As discussed, the “99” values seen in Figure 6 
indicate that the other combat elements will not be deployed during any 
operational phase. 
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Figure 6.  Operational Phase Timeline 
 
 
2. Force Mixes 
Some of the most critical decisions that must be made by the GCE staff 
involve the assignment of units to deployment phases. The staff must ensure that 
the force ashore is sufficiently capable of meeting the requirements set forth by 
the operational plan for each day. To represent the wide spectrum of possible 
deployment schedules, five force mixes were established for this study (Table 2). 
These force mixes were constructed to represent degrees of combat power 
arriving at different times. The following descriptions are meant to provide  





Table 2.   Force Mix Composition 
Force 
Mix 
AE AFOE FBE 
1 Full GCE --- --- 
2 3/3 sub-units H&S units*  --- 
3 2/3 sub-units 1/3 sub-units H&S units* 
4 1/3 sub-units 2/3 sub-units H&S units* 
5 1/3 sub-units 1/3 sub-units 1/3 sub-units 
H&S units* 
*Only H&S units belonging to a battalion or larger were moved independently of 
their parent unit. Below the battalion level, HQ elements were phased in such a 
manner that kept the commander with the majority of his forces. 
3. Utilization Rate 
Quantified by number of operating hours per day, utilization rate 
represents a component of tempo. Working from the baseline values provided in 
the 2024 MEB Baseline constructed by Group W, four categories were built for 
this study to represent a spectrum of utilization rates. The values for these 
categories were generated by taking 75 percent, 90 percent, 110 percent, and 
125 percent of the baseline hours per day for each equipment type. For some 
equipment types with high baseline utilization rates, it was necessary to cap the 
values at 24 hours per day. To reflect the differences in utilization rates that will 
exist between operational phases, variations were made that rose the utilization 
rate during surge and lowered it during sustain. Table 3 is a depiction of the 
variation in utilization rate as a percentage of the baseline values for each 
operational phase.  
Table 3.   Utilization Rate Distinction 
Phase Low Med Low Baseline Med High High 
Forced 
Entry 
75% 90% --- 110% 125% 
Surge 80% 95% --- 115% 130% 




4. Operating Mode 
Also representing a component of tempo, operating mode data refers to 
the percentage of total operating time that the equipment runs in a low operating 
mode. According to the 2024 MEB Baseline, 94 equipment types have a low 
operating mode. Obviously, these values could only be altered for those 
equipment types, with the other equipment consuming energy at a constant rate 
per hour. Similar to the approach taken toward utilization rate, four categories 
were established in order to represent a spectrum of operating mode variation. 
The values for these categories were generated by taking 75 percent, 87.5 
percent, 112.5 percent, and 125 percent of the given baseline. For each of the 94 
applicable types, the baseline value was set to represent that the equipment 
spent 76 percent of its operating hours a low operating mode. The values applied 
to these equipment types are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4.   Operating Mode Distinction 
Operating Mode Low Med Low Baseline Med High High 
% of Baseline 75% 87.5% --- 112.5% 125% 
% of Time in 
Low Op Mode 
57% 66.5% 76% 85.5% 95% 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS  
A. SAMPLING 
To understand the effects of the GCE’s operational behavior, a data set 
was systematically collected to create a fuel consumption response surface. This 
data provided a tie between the way units use their equipment and the amount of 
fuel consumed. It also ties the force’s landing plan to fuel consumption. As 
detailed in the methodology discussion, the data set was generated by running 
many iterations of MPEM through the same operational context. More 
specifically, five force mixes, four utilization rates, and four operating mode 
profiles were combined to form 80 models of the 30-day operation. Through the 
establishment of this spectrum of operational behaviors and force mixes, the 
sample of fuel consumption responses is robust enough to be fit to a linear 
approximation model. These combinations and the resulting responses are given 
in Figure 7. Collectively, the figure depicts the 80 data point response surface 
and serves as visualization for its systematic collection. Model names were 
assigned using the nomenclature convention of “Force Mix #_Utilization Rate 











Figure 7.  Systematic Sampling Plan  
 
 
Each of these 80 models produces daily fuel usage data for every 
individual piece of equipment based on the system and study inputs described in 
the methodology section of this report. The output spreadsheet data can then be 
sorted and filtered by unit, unit function, equipment type, or simply by day of the 
operation. The majority of analysis in this study focuses on the 30-day total fuel 
consumption of the full GCE as well as that of each unit in the order of battle. 
While the total fuel quantity consumed will undoubtedly and predictably differ 
between units, significant insight can be gained by analyzing how force mix, 
utilization rate, and operating mode affect each unit differently. Figure 8 displays 
the 30-day total and average daily fuel consumption output values (in gallons) for 






Figure 8.  Fuel Consumption Responses—Total GCE 
 
 
The raw data presented in Figure 8 provides a broad summary of the 
many MPEM iterations that were conducted. Each of these data points could be 
dissected into its parts to show fuel consumption of each individual unit. The 
same could be done to separate the data by day of the operation. The detailed 
nature of MPEM’s output makes possible a variety of analytical approaches. 
Graphical visualization of the summary data in Figure 8 is useful in revealing key 
trends which validate intuitive understanding about the influence of force mix, 
utilization rate and operating mode.  
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As detailed by Table 2, the force mixes will produce different responses 
because they involve phasing the landing units over an increasingly greater time 
period. Force Mix 1 involves landing the entire GCE in the AE and therefore, with 
all else held constant, should result in greater consumption than the other mixes. 
Force Mix 5, on the other hand, spreads the landing across all echelons and 
thereby should result in lesser consumption. These assumptions are verified by 
Figure 9. The blue ovals in the figure encircle the responses that correspond to 
the force mixes on the x-axis. The y-axes show total GCE fuel consumption in 
gallons. Force Mix 5 is used as the base case and thus is not included in the 
visualization. As expected, one can see a downward trend of fuel consumption 
as the force mixes increase. This validates expectations about the relationship 
between the phasing of units ashore and their fuel consumption over the course 
of the 30-day operation. 
The variation of utilization rate in the sample was summarized by Table 3. 
Intuitively, it stands to reason that the longer a piece of equipment is used in a 
given day the more fuel it will consume. These values were assigned as a 
percentage of the baseline usage values.  The assumption that utilization and 
fuel consumption are positively correlated is validated by Figures 9 and 10. In the 
figures, the red boxes enclose all 80 data points. From the shape of the red 
boxes, one can see the positive trends. The data is displayed in three 
dimensions by Figure 10; fuel consumption, utilization rate, and operating mode. 
The systematic alteration of the percentage of time equipment spends in 
low operating mode is shown by Table 4. As a piece of equipment spends a 
greater percentage of its time in low operating mode, it should decrease the rate 
at which it consumes fuel. Therefore, the percentage of time in low mode and 
fuel consumption should be negatively correlated.  This intuition is verified by the 
green boxes in Figures 9 and 10 by showing a downward trend in response 
values as the percentage of time in low mode increases. 
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Figure 9.  Total GCE Scatterplot Matrix 
 
Figure 10.  Total GCE Three Dimensional Scatterplots 
 
 
B. REGRESSION MODELS 
To examine the trends displayed by the MPEM outputs in greater detail, 
an ordinary least squares regression approach was used to model the 
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quantification of the relationships between operational behavior and fuel 
consumption. The purpose of this approach is not to provide a means to predict 
the fuel consumption of realistic MEB operations, but rather to provide a means 
to understand effect magnitudes across units.  
For this approach, 30-day total fuel consumption values are treated as the 
dependent variables. To gain additional insight, sufficient models were 
constructed to treat each functional unit (infantry, artillery, tanks, etc.) as a 
dependent variable in addition to the total GCE values. This approach permits 
the analyst to quantify the impact that each variable has on fuel consumption in 
order to identify which functional units display behavior that differs from that of 
the GCE as a whole. The presence of “misbehavior,” or trends that significantly 
deviate from those shown by the system as a whole, may indicate a situation 
which deserves unique consideration on behalf of MEB decision makers and 
logistics planners.  
The value of the linear approximation model approach is dependent on the 
quality and fidelity of the regression’s coefficients. To arrive at a valuable 
regression model, therefore, multiple regressions were conducted and their 
characteristics were compared. The proposed alternatives involved the addition 
or subtraction of interaction and polynomial independent variable 
transformations.  
Due to the deterministic nature of the MPEM data sample, many 
traditional significance and goodness of fit metrics are not necessarily applicable 
in this case. Instead, only the R Square and the sum of the absolute value of 
residuals metrics were compared for each regression model. A high R Square 
value is desirable because it indicates that the regression responses are 
accounting for nearly all of the variation found in the sample data. A low sum of 
the absolute value of residuals is desirable because it indicates that the 
regression is producing predictions that closely match the sample data. The 
comparison of these metrics would thereby favor a model that yielded the closest 
approximations to the Total GCE data collected in the MPEM data sample. 
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Comparison between the models are summarized by Table 5. Ultimately, the 
model that performed best was the one which included main effects and the 
interaction terms based on a high R Square value (>.99) and a low sum of the 
absolute value of residuals. The addition of polynomial terms had very little 
impact on the model’s fitness and thus these terms were excluded. The analysis 
that follows in this study, therefore, is based off the main effects plus interaction 
terms model. A more detailed summary and comparison of the characteristics of 
the four regression models can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 5.   Regression Model Comparison 
 Main Effects ME+Interactions ME+Polynomials ME+Int+Poly 
R Square 0.956849 0.999364 0.956853 0.999368 
Sum of Absolute 
Residuals 
3,374,495 429,825 3,371,332 429,825 
 
A summary of the regression coefficients of the total GCE (left) as well as 
the largest two consuming units, Tank Battalion (middle) and Amphibious Assault 
Battalion (right) are presented in Figure 11. The coefficients listed provide a 
means by which one can compare the relative effect magnitude of force mix, 
utilization rate, and operating mode. The force mix variables are binary in nature, 
and only one of the force mix variables may be activated for a given iteration (or 
none to represent the base case of force mix 5). The utilization rate and 
operating mode variables, however, are continuous in nature. In the MPEM 
sample data, utilization rate values fall between 75 and 125 and represent a 
percentage of baseline usage applied to the forced entry phase (see Table 3). 
The operating mode values present in the sample data fall between 57 and 95 
and represent a percentage of time that equipment is employed in low operating 
mode (see Table 4). The coefficients for these two variables are relatively low, as 
compared to those of force mixes, because the variables themselves will assume 
larger continuous values. The coefficients, and their relative magnitudes across 
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the GCE’s sub-units, form the foundation for further analysis and operational 
insight. 




VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
An understanding of how the fuel demand of the GCE and its 
subcomponents are influenced by operational decisions and policies offers an 
opportunity to ease the burden on the critically constrained petroleum logistics 
network. This study’s systematic variation of factors in MPEM created a data set 
which represents a spectrum of outcomes based on possible operational 
decisions. The ordinary least squares regression approach provides quantifiable 
insight regarding how the various policies affect fuel demand over a 30-day 
period. In the interest of providing valuable operational insight and 
recommendations, further organization and interpretation of the regression data 
will follow. 
B. OPERATIONAL INSIGHT 
1. Behavior of the GCE Units 
To gauge the behavior of each functional unit relative to that of the total 
GCE, the coefficient estimates are divided by the estimate of means. This metric 
is indicative of the degree to which a marginal change in that factor affects the 
predicted fuel consumption value.  Summarized by Figure 12, this approach and 
quantifies deviation of the values from the baseline total GCE values. This 
provides insight into which functional unit(s) “misbehave” relative to the larger 
system.  
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Figure 12.  Coefficient/Estimate of Means Measures 
 
 
As indicated by the total deviation values above, the Division HQ 
Detachment shows the largest deviation from the system baseline followed by 
the Amphibious Assault Battalion and Combat Engineer Battalion. This means 
that marginal changes in utilization rate and operation mode values result in a 
relatively large impact on these units fuel consumption. In other words, the 
greater the total deviation value in Figure 12, the greater the elasticity of that unit 
with respect to MPEM input values. This would seem to suggest that a change in 
Division HQ, Amphibious Assault Battalion, or Combat Engineer Battalion’s 
utilization rate or operating mode policies would have the greatest impact on total 
fuel demand. This approach ignores, however, the total fuel quantity used by 
each respective unit. For example, a change in the Division HQ Detachment’s 
behavior will do little to impact the Total GCE fuel consumption because that unit 
represents only 2 percent of the GCE demand. A policy that influences the 
behavior of the Amphibious Assault Battalion, on the other hand, would impact 
the consumer of 34 percent of the GCE demand. 
2. Opportunities for Impact 
A policy that affects utilization rate or operating mode represents an 
opportunity to decrease the quantity of fuel that must be moved to support forces 
operating ashore. Figures 13 and 14 are graphical representations of where 
these opportunities present themselves. The graph plots coefficient and total fuel 
demand in order to identify which units could significantly impact total fuel 
consumption if behavior were to change.  
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In Figure 13, the top right quadrant represents where the utilization rate 
coefficient is high and the unit’s 30-day fuel consumption is high. Units that 
occupy this quadrant, therefore, represent the greatest opportunities to reduce 
the amount of fuel that needs to be moved ashore. Unsurprisingly, the 
Amphibious Assault Battalion and Tank Battalion are clearly separated from the 
units in this respect. 
In Figure 14, the top left quadrant represents where the operating mode 
coefficient is a large negative number and the unit’s 30-day fuel consumption is 
high. Therefore, instituting a policy that increases the amount of time that unit’s 
equipment operates in low mode would have the greatest impact on total fuel 
consumption when applied to units that occupy the top left quadrant. Once again, 
the Tank Battalion represents the greatest opportunity to have such an effect. 
Counterintuitively, the Amphibious Assault Battalion appears in the top right 
quadrant of this graph which means that while total fuel consumption is high, the 
operating mode coefficient is a small negative number. This is an artifact of the 
model and can be easily traced to the MPEM equipment profiles which contain 
data for the M1A1 tanks to operate in low mode, but not for the AAVs. Assuming 
that this is an accurate representation of the equipment capabilities, a policy that 
encouraged increased use of the low operating mode would best be applied to 
the Tank and Artillery Battalions. For example, positioning tanks and artillery in 
static firebases would permit them to increase the amount of time their 
equipment can operate in low mode. Meanwhile, patrolling requirements which 
require prolonged maneuver could be tasked to AAVs, Infantry, and LAR since 
they represent a lesser opportunity to impact the overall consumption of the 
GCE. 
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Figure 13.  Utilization Rate: Coefficient versus Demand Visualization 
 
Figure 14.  Operating Mode: Coefficient versus Demand Visualization 
 
 
3. Force Mix Comparison 
There are also insights to be gained through analysis of the force mix 
effects. This helps to understand how a change in deployment and movement 
ashore timing, like the one developed in this study, effects the total fuel demand 
over a 30-day period. The resulting quantifiable differences between force mixes, 
however, are the direct result of the decisions described in the experimental 
design section and Appendix A. Studying the differences between force mixes is 
valuable as it works to identify trends, support assumptions, and provide an 
example for future comparison. Identifying the percentage change between 
Force Mixes for each unit creates a valuable metric for comparing the effects of 
prolonging the deployment schedules of each unit. Using this approach, one 
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could conclude whether a greater impact is achieved by prolonging the landing 
schedule of the Tank or Artillery Battalion relative to its total fuel consumption. 
This would also provide insight about the marginal added benefit to be gained 
from shifting to successively longer timelines. The percentages of fuel 
consumption decrease that results from moving between force mixes is shown by 
Table 6 and Figure 15. 
Table 6.   Effect of Force Mix Changes on Demand 
 
Figure 15.  Force Mix Changes versus Demand Visualization 
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As shown in Figure 15, the differences between each force mix are a 
function of when H&S and/or elements of combat power are moved ashore and 
thus how long they operate and demand fuel. Force Mix 1 is very robust early in 
the operational timeline, and calls for the deployment of the entire GCE in the 
AE. Force Mix 2 shifts the deployment of all H&S elements at the battalion level 
or higher to the AFOE.  Depicted in the upper left corner of Figure 15, therefore, 
is the percentage decrease in consumption that is caused by delaying the 
deployment of H&S elements by roughly four days. This graphic has indicated 
that, proportionally, the Combat Engineer Battalion, and Infantry Regiment are 
affected more by such a change. In other words, relative to the rest of the GCE, 
these two units have a greater percentage of their fuel demand being generated 
by H&S assets.  
As shown in Appendix A, the Division HQ Detachment is treated as a 
purely H&S element and thus there is little value in comparing it to the rest of the 
GCE. Conversely, since the Reconnaissance Company is below the battalion 
level, its HQ Platoon is moved only when it allows the commander to remain with 
the majority of his company. This explains the unique, seemingly polar, behavior 
of these two units.  
The Tank, Amphibious Assault, and Artillery Battalions behave similar to 
each other in that a greater portion of their fuel demand is generated by the line 
companies or firing batteries rather than their H&S counterparts. The greatest 
decrease in fuel demand for these units comes when these sub-units are moved 
from the AE to the AFOE or FBE. The fuel consumption of the Light Armored 
Reconnaissance H&S element is approximately the same as that of its line 
companies. 
 
4. Ship to Shore Capacity Implications 
Using the data and assumptions detailed by the MAGTF Lift & Distribution 
Study, it is possible to ascertain the feasibility of supplying the GCE with fuel 
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using only the ship to shore connectors available to the MEB. A summary of this 
data, assumptions, and subsequent conversion calculations can be found in 
Appendix D. As a result of the experimental design of this study, a wide spectrum 
of MPEM output data (30-day fuel consumption) was collected based on the 
systematic variation of inputs. Analysis of the feasibility of this concept reveals 
the following general findings.  
Considering the average daily fuel consumption for each model over the 
30-day period and the daily connector throughput capacity makes it possible to 
arrive at the percentage of total capacity that must be dedicated solely to the 
movement of fuel if that model’s demand is to be met. Such analysis finds that in 
order to satisfy the model with the greatest average daily demand, that in which 
Force Mix 1 and high UR/OM levels are utilized, 2.5 percent of total connector 
throughput capacity must be dedicated to fuel movement. The model with the 
least daily demand, that in which Force Mix 5 and low UR/OM levels are utilized, 
requires that 0.5 percent of connector capacity be dedicated to fuel movement. 
The average amount of throughput capacity that must be devoted to fuel across 
all models is 1.2 percent.  
A different approach is to consider the number of supportable days given 
a maximum percentage of capacity that can be devoted to fuel. This yields 
different results than the average daily consumption method as it considers the 
MPEM output data for each individual day. At the heart of this approach is the 
principle of minimizing inventories, and the accompanying logistical footprint 
ashore. Instead it represents a “just in time” approach in which only the amount 
of fuel needed for the following days operations are delivered. Appendix E shows 
several tables that reveal the feasibility in number of days for each model given a 
certain percentage capacity dedication. Those results are summarized by Table 
7 and Figure 16. 
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Table 7.   Feasibility of Ship to Shore Fuel Resupply 
Percent of Connector Capacity 
Dedicated to Fuel Movement 
Percent of Models that are 







Figure 16.  Model Feasibility Graph 
 
 
Though these numbers may seem low, direct competition with other 
classes of supply for space aboard connectors may stress the over the shore 
logistics network considerably. Whether the existence of fuel inventories ashore 
is permitted or not, this data provides an appreciation for what could be a 
problematic connector throughput capacity constraint if the system is not 
managed appropriately. Additionally, it is important to note that these values are 
based on solely supporting the GCE with their organic logistics assets. In this 
scenario, all ACE, LCE, and CE units are receiving their fuel directly from the 
seabase and thus are not competing for connector capacity. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this study resulted in numerous important findings, its limitations in 
scope and data availability call for additional study and continued research to 
address the research questions comprehensively. The following list is composed 
of recommended focus areas for future research efforts. 
1)  The availability of various combat simulation and modeling 
techniques presents an opportunity to expand upon the force mix approach of 
this study. The use of MASS (United States Marine Corps, 2015) to develop a 
comprehensive logistics plan followed by the use of a tool like MANA (Parker Jr., 
2015) could yield insight regarding the efficiency, feasibility, and effectiveness of 
landing plans, force composition and logistics networks in various combat 
scenarios.  
2) This study attempted to keep assumptions regarding maintenance 
and fuel consumption rates consistent with the MPEM Baseline values. The 
effects of utilization rate and operating mode were revealed through systematic 
variation of each model. In a realistic operational scenario, each of these rates 
will vary. Should adequate data become available regarding variation amongst 
equipment in specific operational scenarios, it could be applied to a study that 
focused on accurately modeling total fuel consumption. Such an effort could work 
toward validating the tools and approach in order to create buy in amongst the 
logistical planners of the operating forces. 
3) Any attempt at the facilitation of “just in time” logistics will rely 
heavily on the uninterrupted flow of timely and accurate information. Without the 
reliable transmission of fuel levels, maintenance issues, local supply inventories, 
etc., planners will be forced to position safety stock resources ashore and thus 
incur additional operational risk. Research should be dedicated to not only the 
 56
development of “common logistics operational picture” software, but also its 
integration with an optimized inventory management and control system.  
D. SUMMARY 
Through the use and application of MPEM, this study primarily aimed to 
improve the accuracy with which fuel usage is forecasted and provide insight that 
may help logistics planners to better understand tradeoffs between operational 
and foundational risk. To that end, the main effort of this study revealed the 
following significant insights: 
1)  The implementation of a policy that seeks to lower utilization rate 
will have the greatest effect on total fuel consumption quantities when applied to 
Amphibious Assault, Tanks, and Artillery Battalions. 
2) The implementation of a policy that seeks to raise the use of low 
operating modes will have the greatest effect on total fuel consumption quantities 
when applied to Tank Battalions, Artillery Battalions, and Infantry Regiments. 
3) The delayed deployment of H&S elements at the battalion level and 
above has the greatest proportional effect on the fuel consumption of the Combat 
Engineer Battalion  and Infantry Regiment. The delayed deployment of other 
sub-units (line companies and firing batteries) has the greatest proportional effect 
on the fuel consumption of the Tanks, Amphibious Assault, and Artillery 
Battalions. 
4) Any of the policy implementations or behavioral changes listed 
above would work to reduce a stressed ship to shore logistics system which may 
be forced to rely on low capacity connectors. This system could require the 
dedication of up to 2.9 percent of the MEB connectors’ throughput capacity by 
weight solely to fuel transportation in order to meet the GCE’s daily demand 
throughout the advertised 30-day window of self-sustainability. Considering the 
additional requirements imposed by various other classes of supply which must 
also be moved via these same connectors, this system must be well managed in 
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order to avoid shortfalls. That said, the capacity and throughput of MEB 
connectors appears sufficient to support GCE operations ashore. The addition of 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 59




































APPENDIX C. REGRESSION DATA AND COMPARISON 
A. MAIN EFFECTS MODEL 
 
   
 
The main effects model was outperformed by subsequent models based 
on the R Square value. While an R Square in the low to mid 90s is adequate, the 
inclusion of additional terms raises the R Square above .99. 
Several of the Mix 4 coefficients have high p-values which indicate that the 
coefficient cannot confidently be stated to be non-zero. Preference will be given 
to subsequent models which minimize the presence of possibly insignificant 
coefficients. 
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The addition of interaction terms to the main effects model improves the R 
Square values to above .99. This indicates that the model explain nearly all of the 
variation in the 30-day total fuel consumption data.  
This model also has a few high Mix 4 coefficient p-values. These 
instances seem to occur at roughly the same rate as in the main effects model. 
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Improvement in the R Square, therefore, is grounds for prefering this model over 
the main effects model.  
 
C. MAIN EFFECTS + POLYNOMIAL TERMS MODEL 
 
The inclusion of polynomial terms to the main effects model shows no 
change whatsoever in the R Square values. This is because all of the polynomial 
terms coefficients have very high p-values and thus cannot confidently be stated 
to be non-zero. The addition of polynomial terms to the model, therefore, was 
completely ineffective. 
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Again, the polynomial terms are insignificant in this model. The R Square 
values are above .99 due to the inclusion of the interaction terms. Therefore, the 
interaction terms + main effects model is preferred over this model. 
 





Comparison of the Residual vs. Predicted plots shows that the addition of 
interaction terms reduces the parabolic and conical trends that are present in the 
main effects model. A less correlated plot of residuals is the result of more 
constant variance, and thus indicative of a better model. 
 
 
 A second validation step is to plot the residuals by row to ensure that the 
data does not exhibit correlation based on its position in the data set. These plots 
(shown below) show a wave-like pattern that would typically be cause for 
concern. In this particular case, however, this is simply the result of the 
systematic collection and organization of the data. The rows in the original data 
table could easily be randomized without losing fidelity to show normality in the 








A third model validation step is to analyze the normal probability plot of the 
residuals. Ideally the residuals will align closely with the center line of the graph 
and the histogram on the left will be normally distributed around zero. The plots 
below show that both of these requirements are adequately met and thus the 
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APPENDIX D. CONNECTORS & CAPACITY CALCULATIONS 
 
 
Using the above data presented in the MAGTF Lift & Distribution Study 
(United States Marine Corps, 2015), a few simple calculations were performed in 





The above calculations aim to identify an accurate cargo fuel capacity of 
each type of connector. The optimized number of containers data was solved 
using a simple linear programming approach to maximize the quantity of fuel that 
each connector can move while accounting for the container weight without 





The above data places the previous calculations into an operation context 
by accounting for the number of each connector type present in the full MEB as 
well as the distance each connector can travel given speed and crew-day 
constraints. In this operational context, it is clear that the use of the six-con 
system restricts the quantity of fuel that can be moved due to the heaviness of its 
steel frame construction. The use of the 500 gallon bladder system allows for 
over 500,000 additional gallons to be moved per day as compared to using the 
six-con systems. The use of the 20k gallon bladder proved effective in increasing 
the amount of fuel that could be transported by surface connectors, but it was too 
heavy to be lifted by vertical connectors. Therefore, an additional approach 
allowed for the use of both bladder systems and resulted in the additional 
transportation of approximately 50,000 gallons per day as compared to the use of 
only 500 gal bladders. It is the data resulting from this final approach that is used 
in feasibility. 
 83
APPENDIX E. FEASIBILITY OF SHIP TO SHORE FUEL 
MOVEMENT 
 
This table shows the percentage of total connector capacity (using both 
20k and 500 gal bladder systems) that must be dedicated solely to fuel 
transportation in order to meet the average daily demand of each of the 80 




The number of feasible days when 21,500 gallons are transported per day 
(assuming no inventory) are shown for each MPEM model. This is a significant 
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quantity of fuel because it represents the capacity of a single SSC. Therefore, the 




The number of feasible days when 49,000 gallons are transported per day 
(assuming no inventory) are shown for each MPEM model. This is a significant 
quantity of fuel because it represents the capacity of a single SC(X)R. Therefore, 
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